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Use of the term "effective states" has proliferated in recent years, despite confusion over what 
state effectiveness fundamentally is and how it can be achieved or measured. This article 
aims to refocus the debate by proposing a workable definition of state effectiveness and 
answering a concrete comparative empirical question about why some states are more 
effective than others at tackling similar challenges, even among some of WKHZRUOG¶VSRRUHVW
countries. The empirical puzzle relates to the degree to which states succeed in efforts to 
regulate and tax economic activities in the urban informal economy. Informal economic 
activity is often extremely lucrative but by its very nature subject to little official taxation or 
effective regulation, posing challenges to state consolidation by undermining the public 
revenue base and rule of law. Notwithstanding important debates about the degree to which 
states should seek to regulate and formalize such activity,1 the informal economy constitutes 
a domain in which states seek to impose a number of rules, the effectiveness of which can be 
observed and analysed.  
This paper focuses on the urban informal transport sector, a particularly profitable, 
fast-growing, and under-regulated sector in many developing countries. Uganda has both one 
of the highest urban growth rates in Africa and among the least regulated urban transport 
sectors.2 This is especially evident in the capital Kampala, where public transport is 
dominated almost entirely by matatus (informal minibuses) and boda-bodas (motorcycle-
taxis). The latter, which constitute the empirical focus of this paper, have experienced 
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extraordinary rates of growth since the 1990s without any effective state control. As this 
paper will show, this is noWEHFDXVHRIDQDEVHQFHRIUHJXODWLRQVEXWEHFDXVHRIWKHVWDWH¶V
ineffectiveness in implementing the regulations introduced. By 2010, boda-bodas were 
omnipresent in the city, and their drivers were widely considered to constitute an urban 
underclass of "rogues" and criminals that the state was powerless to control.  
  Meanwhile in Kigali, the Rwandan capital, the motorcycle-taxi sector went from 
being similarly lawless to one of the most tightly-regulated in Africa, if not the world. This 
divergence between effective and ineffective implementation of regulations and policies 
occurred despite many socioeconomic, geographic, and historical similarities between the 
two contexts. This article aims to explain the divergence in effectiveness through a 
comparative case study framework and inductive process-tracing methods. In so doing it 
proposes an explanation for differential state effectiveness that highlights the importance of 
informal political processes rather than the technical bureaucratic capacities that have 
preoccupied many concerned with state performance. 
 
Conceptualizing and Studying State Effectiveness 
What is state effectiveness?  The concept of an "effective state" is deceptively simple; in 
fact, there is little consensus or clarity regarding what constitutes one, and definitions often 
depend on the eye of the beholder. To consider just two examples, a research group 
concerned with citizenship defines an effective state as one that is "inclusive, democratic and 
just,"3 while a political scientist interested in political organization defines it in relation to the 
degree to which state bureaucracies are professionalized.4 Rendering the concept analytically 
useful requires a precise and limited definition, accepting that effectiveness does not 
necessarily subsume accountability, democracy, and all the other qualities we might want 
states to have.  
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$ILUVWWDVNLVWRGHILQHWKHVWDWH7KLVDUWLFOHDGRSWV6WHSDQ¶VGHILQLWLRQRIWKHVWDWHDV
being much more than just the government, comprising "the continuous administrative, legal, 
bureaucratic and coercive systems" in a particular polity that aim to structure relationships 
between civil society and public authority.5 States are thus rarely coherent and unified actors. 
Moreover, every state is more effective at some things than others, and even some of the 
weakest states in Africa can exhibit "islands of effectiveness."6 Hence rather than 
categorizing states as definitively effective or ineffective, it is more productive to focus on 
particular instances of state effectiveness and the processes through which they are realized.  
This study adopts a simple, non-normative definition: state effectiveness refers to 
situations where the stated aims of government, codified in policies, laws, and regulations, 
are translated into accomplishment. State effectiveness is therefore defined strictly in relation 
to implementation ± to bringing a stated goal into effect. This is certainly not the only 
desirable attribute of modern states; questions such as how policies are decided upon and 
what accountability mechanisms are in place are extremely important. The point is that these 
attributes are best considered as distinct from effectiveness and may or may not go hand in 
hand with it.  
 
Methodological Approach  In seeking to understand state effectiveness with regard to 
particular policies and regulations, this paper adopts a comparative case study framework and 
theory-guided process-tracing approach.7 ,IROORZ+DOO¶Vstrategy of beginning with a 
specified set of theoretical propositions that identify potential causal factors discussed in a 
range of relevant literature.8 The validity of these can then be explored through a 
"theoretically explicit" comparative analysis, drawing out "causal process observations" in 
the case studies and facilitating the evaluation of the propositions through the case material.9 
Rather than formally testing a specific hypothesis, the approach thus aims to build detailed 
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narratives that provide scope for assessing the analytical power of extant theoretical 
arguments and how they speak to one another. This kind of process-tracing is aimed not at 
testing theory but at further developing it,10 particularly with respect to how a multiplicity of 
causal factors interact. 
A structured, focused comparison is employed between two cases selected on "most 
similar" grounds: in other words, they exhibit many similarities but strong variance on the 
dependent variable of interest.11 Both Uganda and Rwanda are situated in a part of Africa 
dominated by powerful Kingdoms for centuries before colonialism, sharing a history of 
bureaucratic centralization that is unusual on the continent. They are very similar in terms of 
their economies, levels of poverty, population densities, urbanization levels, urban growth 
rates, and degree of democratic institutionalization.12 Notwithstanding the problems with 
cross-country measures of regime type (and important differences in political space to be 
discussed subsequently), both regimes were classified as "closed anocracies" by Polity IV 
and "semiauthoritarian" by Freedom House at the time of this research.13 The ruling parties 
both derived directly from rebel military organizations and achieved power through guerrilla 
struggle after devastating civil conflicts. More unusually, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
was literally formed inside the Ugandan National Resistance Movement (NRM) by 
Rwandese exiles in Uganda.14  
The decision to take capital cities specifically as a unit of comparison is consistent 
with an emerging consensus on the value of comparing sub-national units in cross-national 
comparative analysis.15 The cities concerned exhibit substantial similarities: both are by far 
the largest in the country, with estimated night-time populations of around 1 million in Kigali 
and 1.5 million in Kampala,16 featuring comparable terrain of hills and swamps, tropical 
climates, and little by way of formal employment. Despite these similarities at both national 
and city level, their variation with regard to the outcome of interest²effective 
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implementation of policies, laws, and regulations pertaining to transport in the capital city²
is extreme, as will be demonstrated. To explain this divergence through process-tracing 
analysis, multiple research methods were utilized during six months of fieldwork in the two 
cities between January 2009 and February 2010. These included interviews with state 
officials, politicians, transport workers, and non-governmental organizations, and analysis of 
newspapers, policy documents, and government data. Before considering the empirical 
material, I now turn to the "theoretical priors" against which this research will be analysed. 
 
What Causes State Effectiveness? Five Propositions  Many accounts of state performance 
in the developing world attach supreme importance to bureaucratic capacity, sometimes using 
the term interchangeably with effectiveness.17 Following Putzel, I define capacity as referring 
to the skills, formal institutional systems (e.g. regarding policy formulation and financial 
management), number of educated personnel, and financial and technical resources within the 
state bureaucracy.18 It is towards these that "capacity building" initiatives are targeted in 
developing countries, and it is clear why they should in theory enhance state effectiveness. 
Proposition one is, therefore, that states will be more effective at implementing policies and 
regulations the greater their bureaucratic capacity.  
There are many reasons, however, to believe that effectiveness in translating policy to 
accomplishment is about much more than this. The analytical prism adopted here proposes 
four overarching concepts to encapsulate other potentially critical factors: autonomy, 
infrastructural power, credibility (of government commitments), and legitimacy. These 
represent a distillation of the explanatory factors for state effectiveness found in a broad 
range of literature in comparative politics, political economy, and political sociology. They 
also represent an effort to deepen and expand upon the common tendency in policy 
discourses to distinguish between DJRYHUQPHQW¶V ³willingness" and "ability" in discussions 
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of state effectiveness. Democracy and political competition, it should be noted, do not form 
the basis for any of these propositions because their relationship to state effectiveness is so 
ambiguous and contested in the literature.19 There is little to suggest that democracy in and of 
itself causes a state to be more or less effective. This issue will, however, be picked up again 
where relevant to the analysis.  
TKHLGHDRIWKHVWDWH¶V"relative autonomy," which dates back to Marx and Weber, has 
been central to recent LQWHUHVWLQWKHVWDWH¶VUROHDV an actor in spurring economic 
transformation.20 The idea is highly problematic, especially given that states are far from 
coherent units and that many "developmental" states actually had intimate relationships with 
private sector actors even as they disciplined them.21 Despite the many difficulties with the 
concept, it is so prevalent in the literature as to merit a proposition. Discussing the autonomy 
RI³WKHVWDWH´ in general terms is unsatisfactory, but the extent and nature of ties between 
component elements of the state and particular social forces have clear relevance here. As 
Rueschmeyer and Evans suggest, autonomy relative to one social class is often achieved by 
way of state actors becoming less autonomous relative to another.22 The idea of autonomy 
may therefore be useful insofar as we can talk of the autonomy of particular arms of the state 
vis-à-vis particular groups and in relation to specific goals. The degree to which different 
state organizations are or are not constrained by social groups on whom they depend for 
resources, legitimacy, or votes is likely to matter for state effectiveness. Proposition two is 
that states will be more effective at implementing particular policies the more autonomous 
state agents are vis-à-vis interest groups that may be negatively affected by those policies and 
thus seek to block them.  
Many analyses of state performance do not look much further than capacity and 
autonomy. Effective implementation, however, also raises questions about deeper societal 
power relations and how they affect state actions. 0LFKDHO0DQQ¶VFRQFHSWRI"infrastructural 
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power" is of particular utility here.23 In his "Alice in Wonderland" analogy, infrastructural 
power LVWKH5HG4XHHQ¶V logistical ability actually to hunt down Alice and execute her, 
while "despotic power" LVWKH4XHHQ¶VSRZHUWRorder her head to be cut off. Infrastructural 
power is fundamentally about the logistical penetration of civil society and is distinct from 
state capacity as defined here; government penetration of social life may have more to do 
with traditions of social control and hierarchical patterns of communication than bureaucratic 
competence. As argued in the introduction to a recent journal issue dedicated to the concept, 
it should be distinguished from both bureaucratic professionalism and state autonomy.24 
Proposition three is that states will be more effective where they have a greater degree of 
infrastructural power. Again, this may be hard to identify and measure but is worthy of 
exploration through case material. 
 While the three factors discussed thus far caQEHWKRXJKWRIDVUHODWLQJWR³top-down´ 
aspects of state effectiveness, it is also important to consider the potential ³bottom-up´ 
elements. When concerned (as this paper is) about the enforcement of particular laws and 
regulations, the other side of the coin is popular compliance. Compliance is more likely if 
government commitments to implementation are actually credible to the social actors on the 
receiving end. Credible commitment, Kenneth Shepsle has argued, can be achieved in two 
main ways: either through binding constitutional mechanisms that disable government 
discretion, or through a situation where the incentives that caused particular commitments to 
be made remain in place. In the latter case, credibility is self-reinforcing and "motivational."25 
In contexts where the rule of law for elites is still lacking (as is arguably the case in most 
developing countries),26 we would expect any credibility to be motivational. Such credibility 
is arguably further enhanced through cumulative actions, when rewards and punishments are 
consistently applied, heightening incentives for compliance. Moreover, where government 
commitments are not credible to state actors themselves, formal organizational rules have less 
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force, and incentives for corruption and negligence are greater. Proposition four is therefore 
that states will be more effective where government commitments are motivationally credible 
both to the social actors affected by them and the state officials implementing them.  
A final factor with a long pedigree in explaining state performance is legitimacy and 
WKHQDWXUHRIDVWDWH¶Vsources RIOHJLWLPDF\,IROORZ*LOOH\¶Vdefinition, whereby states are 
more legitimate the more they are treated by their citizens as rightfully holding and exercising 
power. Logically, legitimacy should enhance state effectiveness due to a positive impact on 
compliance and acquiescence.27 Yet the sources of legitimacy matter: if a government is 
considered legitimate largely because of state performance (e.g. because the state delivers on 
its formal promises and maintains low levels of corruption), this provides incentives to 
maintain and enhance state effectiveness, producing a virtuous cycle of legitimacy and 
credibility. If instead governing elites garner much of their legitimacy through clientelistic 
relationships to supportive client groups, there is less incentive to make the broad delivery of 
services through the state more effective.28 Proposition five is therefore that states will be 
more effective where the sources of their legitimacy relate to state effectiveness itself, as 
opposed to clientelistic or patrimonial legitimacy. 
In accordance with theory-guided process-tracing, the intention is to take these 
propositions, which have been distilled from a range of literature on states, institutions, and 
development, assess their validity, and explore relationships between them though a concrete 
empirical study. The inter-relationships may be particularly important in accounting for state 
effectiveness. As already suggested, in theory there can be positive complementarities 
between state legitimacy and policy credibility. Both infrastructural power and autonomy 
from certain groups may also enhance credibility, while bureaucratic capacity may enhance 
state legitimacy and foster infrastructural power over time. To explore these interrelationships 
requires attention to the realm of informal politics as well as formal institutions.29 This paper 
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aims to trace whether and how the five stylized factors of capacity, autonomy, infrastructural 
power, credibility, and legitimacy interact and contribute to state effectiveness through local-
level empirical analysis.30 Before turning to this material, the next section briefly provides 
contextual background on the evolution of the informal economy and urban public transport 
sector in the two cities.  
 
The Context: Economic Informality and Transport in Uganda and Rwanda 
The "informal economy" is taken here to refer to activities that in some respects "lie beyond 
or circumvent state regulation."31 As in many developing regions, urban public transport 
became highly informalized across Africa in recent decades as underfunded post-
independence national transport systems collapsed. In this context, "paratransit" services in 
the form of minibuses, microbuses, and motorcycles provided "consummate gap-fillers."32 
However, the effective absence of regulation, including both quality and quantity controls, 
engendered a host of new problems such as extreme competition resulting in overloading, 
congestion, soaring traffic fatalities, and severe labour abuses.33 
Increasing evidence of negative externalities from under-regulation eventually led 
many governments to attempt to bring in new regulations and taxes to stem WKHVHFWRU¶V 
growth and establish order. In Kampala and Kigali, paratransit proliferated at such a high rate 
in the 1990s that in the 2000s there were repeated efforts to regulate it. These efforts were 
particularly notable with regard to motorcycle-taxis, which became major players in both 
FLWLHV¶LQIRUPDOHFRQRPLHV2ULJLQDWLQJLQWKH8JDQGD-Kenya border zone, hence their 
Ugandan name boda-boda (border-to-border), these motorcycle-taxis proliferated in Uganda 
with the arrival of motorized bicycles in large numbers in the 1990s34 and flourished in 
Rwanda after the 1994 genocide.  
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Uganda is a canonical case of economic informalization due to the development of its 
notorious magendo (black market) economy under Idi Amin, which continued to thrive after 
Amin was ousted.35 By the time Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) took power in 1986, the urban economy was overwhelmingly informal. Public 
transport was a substantial component of this burgeoning informal economy, mushrooming in 
size until it employed an estimated 140,000 people in the city by 2010, mostly in the matatu 
(minibus-taxi) sector.36 A basic legal and regulatory framework exists in the 1998 Traffic and 
Road Safety Act. Within the capital, Kampala City Council (KCC) was responsible, in 
theory, for transport planning and the enactment of policies, regulations, and local taxes. At 
various points in the decade 2000±2010, permit-based taxation systems were formally 
introduced for boda-bodas, which until then had been neither taxed nor regulated and were 
growing exponentially. KCC also periodically developed basic regulatory measures on 
maximum numbers, permits, helmets, and reflective jackets.37 The boda-boda VHFWRU¶Vde 
facto absence of regulation in 2010 did not, therefore, reflect the absence of any regulatory 
framework but a complete failure to implement the frameworks introduced.  
5ZDQGD¶VXUEDQDUHDVZHUHDOVRVLWHVRIDERYHDYHUDJHOHYHOVRILQIRUPDOLW\IURPWKH
1970s onwards. From 1970 to 1990, urban growth rates consistently outstripped the African 
average despite little by way of formal sector employment to absorb this population.38 The 
most intense period of informalization took place in the years immediately after the 1994 
genocide, ZKHQWKH5ZDQGDQ3DWULRWLF)URQW53)WRRNFRQWURO7KHFRXQWU\¶V average 
annual urban population growth rate soared to 18 percent in the 1995±2000 period, in the 
context of refugee return on an enormous scale.39 According to a 2001 study, the vast 
majority of businesses in Kigali were unregistered, suggesting a highly informalized 
economy.40 As in Kampala, rapid urban growth accelerated the growth of informal public 
transport. Responsibility for urban transport planning was shared between the Ministry of 
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Infrastructure, the City of Kigali (CoK), DQGWKHFLW\¶VWKUHHGLVWULFWDXWKRULWLHV8QOLNH
Uganda, there was a separate government regulatory body²the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory 
Agency (RURA)²responsible for fares and licensing.  
Kigali also depended heavily on motorcycle-taxis (there called taxi-motos, or just 
motos) for transport by the 2000s. As in Kampala, the city authority introduced new 
regulations in that decade to restrict numbers of taxi-motos and require drivers to wear 
reflective uniforms and carry two helmets.41 Motorcycle-taxi drivers were also supposed to 
pay various taxes and acquire permits annually from RURA. Despite similar conditions at the 
turn of the millennium, however, there was a dramatic divergence between Kampala and 
Kigali thereafter. In Kampala, the exponential growth and outlaw status of boda-bodas 
EHFDPHHYHQPRUHH[WUHPHZKLOH.LJDOL¶Vtaxi-motos became one of the most tightly and 
effectively regulated economic sectors in Rwanda.  
 
Kampala: The "Untouchables" 
The number of boda-boda operators in Uganda allegedly grew by 58.7 percent per annum in 
the 2000s.42 One report found "more than 4,000" drivers in Kampala alone in 2003, while 
another reported 15,979 in November 2007.43 7KH&KDLUPDQRIRQHRI.DPSDOD¶Vboda-boda 
associations put the figure at 40,000 in 2010,44 which matched the general consensus and 
accords fairly well with the growth rate cited above. In 2009, growth was such that in one of 
.DPSDOD¶VILYHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHdivisions, which already accommodated around 5,000, the 
number of boda-boda drivers expanded by twenty or thirty every day.45 
The benefits of boda-bodas for passengers are clear, given their relative agility amid 
the FLW\¶Vincreasing traffic gridlock. For operators, the ready availability of low-powered, 
cheap Japanese motorcycles make the industry the ultimate in fast-return investment.46 The 
government initially cultivated the sector as a means of alleviating poverty and 
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unemployment,47 allocating funds to credit schemes for motorcycle purchase and persuading 
banks to provide loans to prospective boda-boda drivers. Consequently, despite their poverty, 
many drivers owned the motorcycle they operated, usually after having rented it for a period 
under a hire-purchase system negotiated with the original owner.48 The latter would 
commonly make a profit of at least 60 percent out of this transaction; renting out motorcycles 
was therefore a very lucrative business, and some investors allegedly owned hundreds.49  
Locally, drivers were highly organized.  In 2009, HDFKRI.DPSDOD¶VILYH divisions 
contained around 200±300 "stages´²roadside areas where groups of boda-bodas waited to 
pick up customers. Each stage had an elected or nominated chairman, secretary, and 
treasurer.50 National- and city-level organization was considerably more problematic. In 
1993, the Uganda Association of Motorcycle and Bicycle Operators (UAMBO) was formed, 
but this disintegrated to be replaced by an organization called Real Boda-Boda Association, 
which fell apart to be replaced by National Federation for Boda-Boda Operators (NAFEBO) 
in 2006.51 In 2009, NAFEBO was still in evidence but so were other groups, and officials 
were dealing with multiple rival groups all claiming to be the "real" association. Ordinary 
drivers also admitted that the organizations were in "chaos."52  
The case for regulating the sector was clearly strong by the early 2000s. Widespread 
consensus existed among both boda-boda leaders and city authorities that numbers urgently 
needed controlling, and the sheer danger to health and life posed by their proliferation was 
indisputable. Between 2005 and 2006, victims of serious traffic accidents rose from 4,000 
annually to 5,000, with deaths occurring in hundreds and motorcycle accidents as the fastest-
growing subcategory.53 Drivers were considered illiterate "hooligans"; the "worst group" in 
society.54 In addition to helmet requirements, the fact that many drivers did not have driving 
licenses prompted a series of regulations early in the millennium requiring them to carry 
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documents including licenses, Passenger Service Vehicle (PSV) permits, and third-party 
insurance.   
Initial failure to implement these measures resulted in the creation of a special 
motorcycle enforcement unit (Kuboka) in 2005 with the mandate of enforcing regulations and 
prohibiting carrying two passengers simultaneously. Kuboka consisted of boda-boda drivers 
trained by the police as covert enforcement officers familiar with the "tricks of the trade." It 
became associated with bribes and extortion rather than effective regulation and was formally 
disbanded in 2007.55 New guidelines were repeatedly issued by KCC as the decade wore on, 
including a bylaw banning boda-bodas in the city center, requirements about reflective 
jackets, and regulations about carrying extra helmets for passengers.56 The proliferation of 
UXOHVZLWKRXWDQ\FRQWURORYHUWKHLQGXVWU\¶VH[SDQVLRQ, however, only made the prospect of 
implementation more hopeless. 
In 2008, the Inspector General of Police issued a one-year "last chance" ultimatum for 
drivers to conform to regulations, particularly regarding permits, PSVs and helmets.57 
Consequently, there was a particularly fierce crackdown in September-October 2009. Police 
rounded up boda-boda drivers at random and impounded them, demanding sixty to eighty 
thousand Ugandan Shillings (UGX) in fines for absent helmets and documents. However, if 
drivers had ready cash, the police would often instead take a bribe of around thirty thousand 
UGX and let them go. Another crackdown followed in February 2010, initially supported by 
Museveni, who insisted that "we cannot compromise on safety."58 The following month he 
ordered the police to halt it, claiming that "nobody should arrest you because you have no 
helmet," in direct contradiction of the campaign he had mandated the police to carry out.59 As 
one KCC official noted, the sporadic crackdowns improved nothing: "it is like when you 
collect ants in a cup and then you release them to go."60  
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There were also several concerted taxation attempts in the 2000s, none of which 
ultimately succeeded. A first effort came in 2002±2003, but drivers made a successful plea to 
the president, who in June 2004 ordered KCC to stop collecting the tax on the grounds that it 
was resulting in the over-taxation of a new industry.61 7KLVIXUWKHUIXHOOHGWKHVHFWRU¶V
growth, and, with an election looming in 2006 (after multiparty politics was re-introduced), 
the boda-bodas were left untouched by taxation for two years. However, KCC²now 
formally dominated by the opposition Democratic Party²embarked on another attempt in 
2006±2007. Division Chairpersons from all political parties and the City Executive together 
agreed on a new system, involving the payment of a monthly fee to KCC in exchange for a 
display sticker. The sticker scheme began in December 2006 and, despite sometimes violent 
engagement between tax collectors and drivers, was considered successful. The tax was 
modest, only amounting to around 3 percent of a boda-boda GULYHU¶VPRQWKO\HDUQLQJVDQG
there was little evidence that the industry was collectively mobilizing against it.62  
However, after seven months, tax collection abruptly ended in July 2007. When 
questioned about why this was, boda-boda leaders claimed that "NRM politicians came and 
disorganized us". Dissent, they said, was actively stimulated among drivers, who then "cried" 
to Museveni that they needed to keep their money for permits and other costs.63 Again, 
despite initial support for the tax, Museveni misleadingly pronounced resistance as being too 
overwhelming to manage. Bypassing all formal state channels and processes, he simply 
decreed that the tax should be aborted, throwing state policy into disarray.64 In a city where 
0XVHYHQL¶VVXSSRUWKDGEHHQGZLQGOLQJIRUVRPHWLPH, he evidently could not resist the 
temptation to sabotage the tax (which was formally supported by his own party) and cement 
the support of a core urban group that he had symbolically allied himself with in the past 
(Museveni even famously rode a boda-boda to submit his nomination for renewed presidency 
in 2001). TKH150JRYHUQPHQW¶VJDLQIURPWKLVGHVWDELOL]LQJLQWHUYHQWLRQZDVWKHVWDWH¶V
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loss: bureaucratic morale was sapped and policy incoherence compounded. Importantly, it 
was not simply a conflict between local and central government that accounts for these 
RXWFRPHVEXWWKHLQIRUPDOQDWXUHRI0XVHYHQL¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQV, which often contradicted even 
the official central government position.  
Museveni thus directly and repeatedly crippled state effectiveness with respect to 
attempts to regulate and tax the sector. Some boda-boda drivers were acutely aware of this, 
noting that "we often fail to keep the law because the president spoiled the whole system."65 
,WZDVQRWKRZHYHURQO\WKHSUHVLGHQW¶VLQIRUPDOLQWHUYHQWLRQVWKDWUHQGHUHGWKHVWDWH
ineffective. The prevalence of corruption among state enforcement agents and the granting of 
favors by other politicians contributed to the outcome.66  In consequence, boda-boda drivers 
ZHUHRIWHQODEHOOHGIRUHPRVWDPRQJWKHFLW\¶V"untouchables"²groups that the state 
effectively could not touch because that they were protected by a range of powerful 
interests.67 
 
Kigali: A Burgeoning Sector Transformed 
As returnees poured into Kigali after 1994, cycle taxis of all forms became central to the 
FLW\¶Vtransport system, and, as in Kampala, the government was initially broadly supportive 
of this development in the interests of tackling unemployment.68 Despite this, here too in the 
early 2000s the City of Kigali authorities (CoK) became concerned about safety in a sector 
they believed was out of control, causing accidents and fomenting "chaos" in the city. 
Regulations were in place but generally not being enforced by the police.69 Unlike in 
Kampala, however, a total reorganization of the sector was subsequently achieved in the 
middle of the decade.  
The number of taxi-motos at the time the new regulations were introduced is difficult 
to establishEHLQJSULRUWRWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VGULYHWRtransform the sector, but is likely to 
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have been roughly proportional to that in Kampala, with several thousand in the city by the 
early 2000s.70 CoK began by cracking down on push-bike taxis, which in 2005 were barred 
from Kigali altogether and replaced with a limited number of cheap, low-powered mopeds, 
known as "mini-motos." This left around 6,000 former cyclists without jobs.71 The following 
year, the authorities made a decision to ban all forms of bicycle taxi²including taxi-motos²
from the city. This was stimulated not only by a concern with accidents, but by the belief that 
the industry was fomenting drug use, crime, and "disorganization."72 The ban was in place for 
two weeks, but city-dwellers made "a lot of noise," mainly through complaints to the city 
administration and calls into radio stations.73 Consequently, this decision was revoked. 
Unlike in Uganda, however, the government did not change course because they feared 
alienating the constituency of moto drivers. In fact, there was little or no overt protest by this 
group. It was largely the users rather than providers of the service whose objections 
convinced the government that removing all forms of cycle taxi without a good public 
transport system in place could impede development. Some of the most influential complaints 
came from the banks who provided loans for moto drivers and from aid donors.74  
The city government therefore reached a decision, in negotiation with the association 
of taxi-moto drivers (ASSETAMORWA), that they would bring motos back to the city in a 
limited form, with a new set of regulations.75 Alongside CoK, various arms of the state from 
the police to the ministry of youth joined the negotiations, and the result since 2007 has been 
a highly structured system of cycle taxis quite unlike any other motorcycle-taxi sector in the 
world.76 Taxi-motos were initially limited to 3,700 in number, with reflective jackets 
displaying personal identity codes and green helmets (for passenger as well driver) with 
unique identifiers. The remaining moto drivers were fully trained and licensed: those lacking 
permits were "chased out of the city." Mini-motos were allowed to operate in the suburbs 
only, limited to 1,500, and drivers wore blue helmets. The associational life of cycle taxis 
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was further consolidated under ASSETAMORWA: all authorized motos paid daily fees of 
300 Rwandan Francs (RWF) to the association and a system of city "sections" (ten people), 
"parkings" (up to ten sections), and "zones" (ten in total throughout the city), was instituted. 
Each of these levels had an elected leader, and ASSETAMORWA elected a president every 
three years.77 Mini-motos had their own association, ATIMIMORWA, which was organized 
similarly. As in Uganda, hire-purchase systems were in place. By 2009, 70 percent of drivers 
already owned their own motos.78  
Since 2007, far from remaining outlaws, taxi-moto drivers were very active 
participants in community activities through their associations, signing formal agreements 
with CoK to clean city spaces, plant trees, and construct houses for genocide orphans in 
particular areas of the city. This kind of "voluntary" activity, strongly encouraged by the RPF 
government throughout Rwanda, often involved competitions between urban associations to 
achieve particular goals, of which ASSETAMORWA was often a proud winner.79 Taxi-moto 
drivers were also model taxpayers. Each "parking" had a tax collector; in stark contrast to 
.DPSDOD¶VERGD-bodas, drivers paid several taxes and fees, including RWF 20,000 annually 
to RURA for their permit, 4,000 each year to the District for a patente (trading license), and 
around 70,000 annually to the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) in income tax.80 In fact, 
despite their small number, they comprised almost 10 percent RI5ZDQGD¶Vtotal number of 
registered RRA taxpayers (40,500) in 2010.81  
Perhaps most significant of all, the taxi-moto reorganization produced an elaborate 
internal security architecture. Part of the process of reorganizing drivers was "sensitizing" 
them on the importance of order, safety, and security, so that they would become, to a degree, 
self-regulating and self-policing, all RIZKLFKFDQEHOLQNHGWRWKH53)¶VRQJRLQJ
preoccupation with securitizing the Rwandan territory.82 The rationale was that "if you 
understand something then you will do it better than if someone was to police you."83 To 
18 
 
facilitate tight internal organization and security, the codes displayed on taxi-moto GULYHUV¶ 
jackets were incredibly detailed, making drivers immediately identifiable. Thus, if any crime 
was committed by a driver, "we can identify exactly where he sleeps."84   
$66(7$025:$¶VVHFXULW\RIILFHUGHVFULEHGWKHDVVRFLDWLRQDVEHLQJ"under police 
control." Indeed taxi-motos were sometimes effectively used as an extension of the policing 
system: for certain crimes, the police called on ASSETAMORWA to help track down the 
culprit.85 Due to the mobile nature of the job, both the association and CoK were very 
concerned that criminal elements did not infiltrate the sector. Recruitment was extremely 
VWULFWUHTXLUHPHQWVRIDWOHDVWRQH\HDU¶VH[SHULHQFHGULYLQJLQDQXUEDQDUHDwere combined 
with careful vetting by the association. Moreover, alongside official security officers for each 
section and parking area, other inspectors were "put among them so that they can be 
controlled": drivers who acted covertly as security and intelligence agents, recruited by the 
official security officers.86 In sum, despite apparently similar drives to tame this "rogue" 
group within the informal economy, the authorities in Kigali were far more effective than 
those in Kampala at regulating the sector, taxing it, and working with associations to order 
and restructure it. 
 
Comparative Analysis 
As noted previously, both the NRM and RPF regimes can be considered "semiauthoritarian." 
These narratives do indicate, however, that differing degrees of political competition had 
important effects on the extent of implementation. In Kampala the presence of the political 
opposition was real enough that the NRM (and Museveni in particular) clientelistically 
cultivated the boda-boda sector, viewing it as a "consolidated group that he can use to support 
him during elections" in the city.87 The multiparty system Museveni had helped restore in 
2005²partly in order to allow him to overturn Presidential term limits and thereby actually 
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further entrench himself in power²created a situation where the Democratic Party was able 
to formally gain a majority in the elected City Council (as well as the mayoralty) even though 
it posed very little threat to the NRM at the national level. Consequently, informal political 
directives from the president often conflicted with formal policies and regulations and 
frequently rendered KCC ineffective. Indeed, Museveni was able to instrumentalize the 
opposition at the city level as a foil, blaming them for the ineffectiveness of urban policies 
that he was often personally obstructing. Meanwhile in Kigali, the directives issuing from the 
central and local authorities were more consistent and concerted, reflecting 5ZDQGD¶V
relatively centralized governance (despite a very similar decentralization programme to 
Uganda on paper) and undeniably tighter constraints on opposition politics.  
Notwithstanding the clear importance of political opposition (or lack thereof), to 
suggest that the effectiveness with which the Rwandan state pursued its policies was "caused" 
by a less open political environment would be problematic. After all, it is clear that states in 
relatively open political systems in Africa can be very effective (for example, Botswana) and 
that dictatorial systems can render the state completely dysfunctional (as in Zaire under 
Mobutu or Uganda itself under Amin). As noted previously, the relationship between 
democracy and state effectiveness remains highly contested.88 Ultimately, there is not likely 
to be any general relationship between effectiveness and political regime type. This paper 
therefore seeks to assess how the difference in political space interacted with other factors in 
order to evaluate the theory-based propositions about state effectiveness made previously. 
The remainder of this section analyses the degree to which these propositions are supported 
by the empirical narratives above, keeping one eye on the issue of political space.  
There is little to suggest that bureaucratic capacity played any significant role in the 
divergence in effectiveness; in fact, a range of indicators suggests that the Ugandan state had 
greater capacity. For example, Uganda had a much higher number of civil servants per capita 
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for several decades leading up to the millennium89 and superior education indicators well into 
the 2000s.90 Another popular (though problematic) measure of state capacity is income per 
capita; on this Uganda remained consistently just ahead of Rwanda for the whole decade 
2000±2010.91 0RUHDQHFGRWDOO\.DPSDOD¶VLQFRPLQJ&LW\'LUHFWRULQQRWHGKHU
"amazement" DW.&&¶VWHFKQLFDOFDSDFLWLHVJLYHQKRZLQHIIHFWLYHO\WKH\KDGEHHQXVHG.92 
Proposition one about state capacity is therefore of little help in explaining differential state 
effectiveness in these cases. 
Proposition two regarding autonomy has greater relevance, notwithstanding the 
problems with the concept. The interventions from Museveni that impeded the effectiveness 
RIUHJXODWLRQVDQGWD[HVFDQEHOLQNHGWRWKH150¶Vengagement with the boda-boda sector 
since its inception.93 NRM politicians actively sought to destabilize associational life in the 
sector for political gain, most notably through the Kuboka debacle and the stirring up of 
resistance to the sticker tax scheme, suggesting they were deeply entangled in the sector. 
Ordinary dULYHUVZHUHPRVWO\JUDWHIXOIRU0XVHYHQL¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQV94 in which he (somewhat 
ironically) portrayed himself as the heroic savior from an intervening state. This meant that 
the political arm of the state created expectations among the burgeoning ranks of boda-bodas 
that they could remain "untouchable" in exchange for their support, rendering enforcement of 
regulations by the technical arm increasingly difficult. In Kigali, the government was 
certainly deeply involved in the sector, but in a very different way. It was more autonomous 
in that it had never treated taxi-moto drivers as a bank of clients as the NRM did in Uganda; 
consequently, it had few qualms about rendering them numerically insignificant as a social 
group by decimating their number. It only loosened its outright ban because of its concerns 
for other interests, relative to which it was less autonomous, such as bankers and middle class 
commuters. The comparison therefore provides some limited support for proposition two, 
insofar as the autonomy of the ruling elite from the drivers themselves was relevant. 
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There are also interesting elements in the narrative regarding infrastructural power. In 
Rwanda, with its long history of hierarchical power relations, long-standing practices of 
virtually compulsory community activity supervised by state officials allow for regular 
"sensitization" and local knowledge-sharing.95 Moto drivers were intensely involved in this 
through their tightly-structured associations and, consequently, were very aware of the 
reasons for the reorganization of their sector and the futility of protest given how embedded 
state security was within the system.96 Infrastructural power was not totally absent in Uganda, 
either. For example, some sources suggested that boda-bodas helped the NRM penetrate 
society because drivers "go very far and can talk to so many people," rendering them useful 
tools for surveillance in the wake of civil war, and drivers affirmed that boda-boda stages 
often had state security agents working at them.97 However, the apparent lack of knowledge 
among state actors about exactly what was going on in the sector at large, and the lack of 
coherence in their efforts to control it, contrasted sharply with Kigali, suggesting 
infrastructural power was considerably shallower.  
Infrastructural power was also being used in fundamentally different ways in the two 
cases, and this can be related to differences in political space. Interestingly, while "spies" 
were pervasive in the transport sectors in both cities, this resulted in opposite outcomes for 
state effectiveness because the manipulation of the sector through state security agents was 
motivated by fundamentally different political strategies. The overriding interest of the 
Rwandan government in securitizing Kigali meant knowing the city in great detail and 
rendering it legible; thus the engagement of security agents was geared towards these ends, 
which were well-matched with formal institutions of regulation. In Kampala, the greater 
priority for politicians was to maintain clientelistic relationships and bolster support in urban 
areas, where the salience of the political opposition provided both a local threat and a 
convenient scapegoat. Here "spies" were used to destabilize and mobilize as much as "know" 
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and securitize. This resulted in informal political interventions in Kampala that undermined 
rather than supported the formal regulatory framework.    
This difference in both the degree and usage of infrastructural power reinforced the 
credibility of policies and regulations in Kigali, but undermined it in Kampala. The issue of 
credibility can be clearly traced in the comparative narrative and is closely linked with the 
TXHVWLRQRIOHJLWLPDF\$QLURQ\RI.DPSDOD¶VLQHIIHFWLYHUHJXODWLRQLVWKDWboda-boda 
leaders expressed deep enthusiasm for reorganizing the sector but were not working 
concertedly to achieve this because the corresponding commitments on the government side 
severely lacked credibility.98 Moreover, the more that politicians intervened to render 
regulations impotent, the more that their legitimacy was bound to direct, populist engagement 
rather than state performance, and the less credible policy commitments were. This dwindling 
credibility meant that frontline state actors tasked with enforcing laws and regulations would 
either turn a blind eye to contraventions or, during sporadic "crackdowns," merely take bribes 
and then release the culprits, knowing that politicians were highly capricious in their attitude 
towards the issue and unlikely to penalize arbitrariness in implementation.  
In Rwanda commitments were much more credible, partly due to the RPF 
JRYHUQPHQW¶Vparticular sources of legitimacy. Because the RPF was composed of a large 
number of former refugees of the minority Tutsi ethnic group with limited social legitimacy 
in Rwanda, its primary source of legitimacy was halting the genocide and restoring order.99 It 
would therefore only tolerate taxi-motos if they actively contributed to the ends of security 
and order rather than undermining them.100 This made regulating the sector to render it 
legible a motivationally credible priority on security grounds. Taxi-moto drivers asserted that 
the regulation of the sector was about "solidarity and security," noting that high levels of 
organization were important to "fight the thought" of war and conflict. This seems to have 
impacted positively on their compliance.101 Meanwhile government officials stressed that any 
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form of malpractice could cause them to lose their jobs or worse, leading them to take 
enforcement very seriously.102 Indeed, the drive to clamp down on petty corruption, for which 
contemporary Rwanda is now well-known, bolsters policy credibility, and the perception of 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V"seriousness of intent" is an important resource in facilitating 
implementation. The comparison of the two cities thus suggests that propositions four and 
five, on the importance of credible commitment and sources of legitimacy, have considerable 
analytical power²especially when considered in tandem. 
The above discussion highlights how a given cause can work "in combination with 
other causes to produce an outcome."103 Figures 1a and 1b illustrate some of the dynamics of 
interaction between the causal factors and ways in which they can be thought of as 
reinforcing one another. As there is little to indicate the Rwandan state had the greater 
capacity of the two, it seems reasonable to claim that the greater effectiveness was due to 
political dynamics captured by these other interlinking factors. Whether or not the rules in 
place were credible, whether the government had both the infrastructural power and 
inclination to consistently disseminate and apply them, and the degree to which politicians 
drew legitimacy from undermining these rules all played a role. These were matters of 
politics rather than bureaucratic competence. Research elsewhere shows that in relation to 
other aspects of development similar divergences between the two countries are evident, 
including in rural areas²and for broadly similar reasons. In particular, research into both 
maternal health104 and access to safe water provision105 hints at similar causal factors to those 
raised here.  
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Figure 1a: The interplay of causal mechanisms in Kampala 
 
 
Figure 1b: The interplay of causal mechanisms in Kigali 
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This focus on the political drivers of state effectiveness brings us back to the 
aforementioned issue of space for political competition. Rather than identifying variance in 
political openness per se as the primary cause of differential effectiveness, this paper argues 
that deeper socio-political drivers are causally more illuminating and indeed may actually 
help to explain why political space differed in the two countries. After all, an important 
question is why two regimes with highly authoritarian tendencies took such different 
approaches to political space. Although a detailed discussion of this is beyond the scope of 
this article, the foregoing analysis suggests that allowing more or less political openness 
likely relates to issues of how government legitimacy is sourced, whether policy credibility is 
central to this or not, and the depth of existing patterns of social control. The extent of 
political space may thus be partly shaped by some of the same factors that influence the 
degree of state effectiveness²though the presence of political competition can in turn have 
further impacts on effectiveness. As such, rather than being a root cause, this article suggests 
that political space and competition are better conceived as intervening or mediating variables 
when accounting for state effectiveness. Similarly, decentralization and the fact that an 
opposition party was in control locally were not a cause of ineffectiveness. It was the 
strategic ways in which decentralization was informally manipulated to secure legitimacy and 
maintain client ties that hampered the state in Kampala. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has pursued two main goals. The first was to propose a fresh analytical approach 
to state effectiveness, drawing on a wealth of existing theory. The second was to explore the 
propositions underpinning this approach in a concrete comparative empirical study. This 
sought to show how similar rules and regulations formally put in place by the state were 
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effectively implemented in one case but not in the other, explain why this was the case, and 
thereby evaluate the analytical propositions with a view to further theory development.  
The comparative analysis provided here suggests that too much attention has been 
given to bureaucratic capacity in most approaches to state performance, at the expense of 
informal political dynamics. Understanding the causal interactions at play is vital, especially 
in view of the widespread misguided assumption that "capacity building" will adequately 
address poor state performance in developing countries. There is a tendency to think about 
HIIHFWLYHSROLF\LPSOHPHQWDWLRQODUJHO\LQWHUPVRIDJRYHUQPHQW¶VFDSDELOLWLHVRI
enforcement, often conceptualized in terms of both capacity and autonomy, and sometimes 
infrastructural power. Less attention has been paid to the question of compliance²both that 
of the social groups affected and the state actors charged with implementation²which 
requires reference to credibility and legitimacy, and the interplay between them. A holistic 
understanding of effective implementation requires due attention to the drivers of both 
enforcement and compliance.   
The article has also raised important questions about the relationship between state 
effectiveness and political space. It suggests that the relationship between political 
competition and state effectiveness, while evidently significant in the cases examined here, is 
best thought of as being conditioned by other factors. Just as the focus on state capacity in the 
policy world is inadequate to account for the drivers of differential effectiveness, the 
tendency in contemporary political science to privilege "regime type" as an independent 
variable can miss some of the deeper political drivers that can actually shape regime type as 
well as outcomes associated with it. The analysis here suggests that interrogating the drivers 
of state effectiveness and understanding what incentivizes and facilitates different degrees of 
political space are objectives that could fruitfully be pursued in tandem in future research on 
states and development.   
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